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I. Introduction 
Professor Lyman Johnson is not the first, nor will he be the 
last, legal scholar to analyze, conceptualize, and publicize his 
insights about Delaware corporate law. But, among those who 
have made invaluable and enduring contributions to that 
important space, Lyman ranks among the highest, measured by 
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what academics value: influencing the development of Delaware’s 
corporate law. There is solid evidence of that influence, which 
this article is intended to develop. Along the way, we pay tribute 
to one of legal academia’s finest. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts, linked together by the 
concept of prophecy. The first will demonstrate the influence of 
Lyman Johnson’s—we believe prophetic—efforts to maintain the 
integrity of Delaware corporate law principles.1 Those include the 
business judgment rule and its fiduciary duties of care and 
loyalty; and also the proper separation of substantive fiduciary 
duties and the standards by which observance of those duties 
should be reviewed.2 The second part identifies Professor 
Johnson’s galvanizing insights into the subject of officer fiduciary 
duties, and the attention that those insights have engendered.3 
The third and final part focuses on Professor Johnson’s policy 
view that, consistent with its wealth-producing objective, 
corporate law should also serve the welfare of society.4  
II. Lyman Johnson’s Contribution to Doctrinal Sensibility 
Although lawyers, judges, and professors may occupy 
different positions on the legal spectrum, all would—or should—
agree upon the importance of doctrinal clarity and integrity. 
Without it, lawyers could not advise clients with confidence how 
best to conform their conduct to the law, judges could not 
pronounce what the law commands in a way that makes sense to 
the parties and the public, and academics would be unable to 
discharge their role of bringing analytical predictability and 
clarity to the overall endeavor. For business enterprise law in 
particular, doctrinal coherence is highly consequential5 because of 
                                                                                                     
 1. Infra Part II. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Infra Part III. 
 4. Infra Part IV. 
 5. See Lyman Johnson, Rethinking Judicial Review of Director Care, 24 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 787, 789 (1999) [hereinafter Johnson, Rethinking Director Care] 
(“Coherence in legal doctrine is an appealing idea, especially in areas plagued by 
conceptual complexity.”). 
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what is so often at stake—multi-billion dollar transactions that 
have national economic impact. 
Lyman Johnson’s contribution to the clarity and coherence of 
Delaware corporate law doctrine finds its most eloquent and 
enduring expression in three articles that he wrote almost two 
decades ago: Rethinking Judicial Review of Director Care,6 The 
Modest Business Judgment Rule,7 and After Enron: Remembering 
Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law.8 In his first two articles, 
Professor Johnson persuasively advocated that on two bedrock 
doctrinal issues, the business judgment standard of review and 
the fiduciary duty of care, Delaware Supreme Court 
jurisprudence had gone astray and needed a fundamental course 
correction.9 In his third article, Professor Johnson raised the 
question of whether the supposed conceptual distinction between 
care and loyalty is as clear as widely believed and whether the 
duty of loyalty should be more formally recognized as having, in 
addition to its “non-betrayal aspect,” an “affirmative devotion 
dimension.”10 Given the influential impact of these writings, it is 
useful to retrace their ancestry and the insights that underlie 
them, which to us resonate as strongly today as they did sixteen 
years ago. 
                                                                                                     
 6. Id. 
 7. Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 BUS. LAW. 
625 (2000) [hereinafter Johnson, The Modest BJR]. 
 8. Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in 
Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27 (2003) [hereinafter Johnson, 
Remembering Loyalty]. 
 9. See Johnson, Rethinking Director Care, supra note 5, at 832–33 
(seeking a more generalized duty of care for directors to act with reasonable 
prudence, even in the special category of cases where business judgment is 
exercised); see also Johnson, The Modest BJR, supra note 7, at 651 
[B]etween the two concepts [the duty of due care and the business 
judgment rule], the business judgment rule should be the more 
modest construct; that it, not due care, is the better choice to “freeze,” 
leaving due care with its concise, but fluid, “reasonable” and 
“prudent” elements as the superior candidate for remaining what it 
should be—a highly adaptive precept in the hands of common law and 
equity judges. 
 10. See Johnson, Remembering Loyalty, supra note 8, at 30 (articulating 
the different meanings of loyalty within the corporate law context and the 
intersectionality of loyalty and care). 
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The casus belli was a Delaware Supreme Court decision 
handed down in 1993: Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.11 There, 
Technicolor, a Delaware corporation, was acquired by 
MacAndrews & Forbes, Inc. (MAF) in a negotiated two-step 
transaction for a price of $23 per share, the first step being a 
tender offer and the second being a cash-out merger.12 The 
plaintiff shareholders initially filed an appraisal action in the 
Court of Chancery against Technicolor.13 They later brought a 
plenary breach of fiduciary duty class action against Technicolor, 
its directors, and MAF, claiming (among other things) that the 
second step merger was not entirely fair to the minority (non-
MAF) shareholders.14  
In the fiduciary duty action, former Chancellor Allen made 
what the Delaware Supreme Court later described as “presumed 
findings”15 that the Technicolor directors had failed “to reach an 
informed decision in approving the sale of the company.”16 The 
Supreme Court described that finding as “presumed,” because the 
Chancellor had found it unnecessary to make that finding 
formally since, despite the Court’s “grave doubts”17 about whether 
the directors had acted with due care in deciding to approve the 
transaction, the plaintiffs had not proved that the directors’ 
conduct had caused the shareholders any injury.18 The reason 
was that the $23 deal price exceeded the $21 per share “fair 
value” that the Court of Chancery had previously determined in 
the earlier companion appraisal action.19 Applying the traditional 
                                                                                                     
 11. 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993). 
 12. See id. at 349 (discussing the relevant transactions and merger leading 
to the case at issue). 
 13. See id. at 349 (stating the pertinent procedural history, beginning with 
the appraisal action and personal liability action). 
 14. See id. at 349–50 (explaining Cinerama’s dissent from the second stage 
merger in conjunction with the plaintiff’s additional claims). 
 15. See id. at 370–71 (“We adopt, as clearly supported by the record, the 
Chancellor’s presumed findings of the directors’ failure to reach an informed 
decision in approving the sale of the company.”). 
 16. Id. at 369–70. 
 17. Id. at 358. 
 18. See id. at 370 (“[T]he Court of Chancery concluded that Cinerama was 
not entitled to relief because it had failed to present evidence of injury caused by 
the defendants’ negligence.”). 
 19. See id. at 350 (“By unreported decision . . . dated October 19, 1990, the 
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tort principle of “no harm no foul,” and the teaching of cases such 
as Barnes v. Andrews,20 the Chancellor concluded that the 
Technicolor directors were not liable because their conduct had 
caused no harm to the shareholders.21  
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed on the ground that 
the trial court had employed an incorrect mode of analysis.22 
Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the business judgment 
rule, not the common law of torts, was the proper framework 
within which to analyze both the fiduciary duties owed by 
corporate directors in the transactional setting, and the 
standards for reviewing claims that those duties were breached: 
To rebut the [business judgment] rule, a shareholder plaintiff 
assumes the burden of providing evidence that directors, in 
reaching their challenged decisions, breached any one of the 
triads of their fiduciary duty—good faith, loyalty or due 
care . . . . If a shareholder plaintiff fails to meet this 
evidentiary burden, the business judgment rule attaches to 
protect corporate officers and directors and the decisions they 
make, and our courts will not second-guess their business 
judgments . . . . If the rule is rebutted, the burden shifts to the 
defendant directors, the proponents of the challenged 
transaction, to prove to the trier of fact the “entire fairness” of 
the transaction to the shareholder plaintiff.23 
Insofar as the Supreme Court ruling addressed duty of care 
claims, it turned the pre-Technicolor law on its head.24 Before 
Technicolor, if a plaintiff proved that directors failed to exercise 
due care but the failure had caused no harm, the court would 
apply traditional tort analysis and dismiss the claim.25 After 
                                                                                                     
Chancellor found the fair value of the dissenting shareholders’ Technicolor stock 
to be $21.60 per share, as of . . . the date of the merger.”). 
 20. 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). 
 21. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 370 (Del. 1993) 
(stating the Chancellor’s application of Barnes and the finding that Cinerama 
was not entitled to relief for lack of evidence indicating injury to the 
shareholders). 
 22. See id. at 370–71 (explaining how the Chancellor’s conclusion was 
misguided and thus incorrect). 
 23. Id. at 361 (citing Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993)). 
 24. See id. at 371 (“In sum, we find the Court of Chancery to have 
committed fundamental error in rewriting the Delaware business judgment 
rule’s requirement of care.”). 
 25. See id. at 370 (“While Barnes may still be ‘good law,’ Barnes, a tort 
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Technicolor, an adjudicated breach of the duty of care in those 
circumstances would have a quite different effect, namely: (1) it 
would shift the standard of review to entire fairness—the 
standard traditionally reserved solely for determining whether a 
director had violated his or her fiduciary duty of loyalty; and (2) it 
would shift the burden of proving entire fairness to the 
directors.26 
That was revolutionary because no court had ever previously 
held in a duty of care case that the directors must carry the 
burden of establishing the entire fairness of a transaction that 
they had approved.27 Because Professor Johnson believed that 
Technicolor had confused fundamental precepts of American 
corporate law, he embarked on a mission to untangle the 
resulting doctrinal confusion that impacted the substance of the 
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, as well as the relationship 
between those duties and the standards of judicial review. 
Because the above-cited three law review articles were the pillars 
of that mission,28 we next discuss the contributions of those 
articles to the development of Delaware corporate law. 
A. Rethinking Due Care 
In his first article, Rethinking Director Care, Professor 
Johnson criticized Technicolor on numerous grounds, starting 
with the Supreme Court’s failure to elaborate policy rationales for 
                                                                                                     
action, does not control a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.”). 
 26. See id. at 361 (“Under the entire fairness standard of judicial review, 
the defendant directors must establish to the court’s satisfaction that the 
transaction was the product of both fair dealing and fair price.” (citing Nixon v. 
Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1992))). 
 27. See Johnson, The Modest BJR, supra note 7, at 642 (explaining the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision to employ the entire fairness standard in 
relation to the court’s 1985 decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom). 
 28. See Johnson, Rethinking Director Care, supra note 5, at 789–90 
(proposing a general director duty of entire care in Delaware to resolve the 
unsettled law regarding the duty of corporate directors); Johnson, The Modest 
BJR, supra note 7, at 625–26 (advocating a stronger duty of care and a more 
modest formulation of the business judgment rule); Johnson, Remembering 
Loyalty, supra note 8, at 30 (discussing the unclear nature of the duty of loyalty, 
advocating a clearer structure to actually affect corporate doctrine and practice, 
and coining the term “due loyalty”). 
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reviewing care claims in the manner reserved for loyalty claims.29 
The rationale for requiring entire fairness review in the loyalty 
context is that the directors by definition are conflicted, and 
therefore are presumed not to be acting in the interests of the 
shareholders that they have a fiduciary duty to protect.30 There 
being no one to protect the shareholders’ interest, the Court 
becomes by default their only safeguard.31 To discharge that 
function, the Court must use the most stringent weapon available 
to it—imposing the entire fairness standard of review upon the 
fiduciaries.32 Importantly, however, there is no such presumption 
of adversity where directors are not conflicted, even though they 
may have acted without due care.33 Accordingly, Professor 
Johnson urged, no adverse interest presumption should be 
triggered, for which reason Technicolor was flawed because it did 
not recognize, let alone address, the basic underlying policy 
difference between these quite distinct fiduciary duties and why 
they are reviewed by different standards.34  
                                                                                                     
 29. See Johnson, Rethinking Director Care, supra note 5, at 801. 
The failure by the Cede court to elaborate policy rationales for 
stringently reviewing care claims in the manner of loyalty claims may 
simply be because adjudicated breaches of the duty of care have been 
so rare in Delaware that the courts have had little occasion to develop 
more nuanced standards for addressing them. 
 30. See id. at 819 (“A director—who may receive little of the financial 
payoff from undertaking a risk project—will be more risk averse than 
shareholders may rationally desire . . . .”). 
 31. See id. at 809 (explaining that a director may act with care without 
acting out of care for the shareholders’ interests and thus requiring court 
supervision). 
 32. See id. at 792 (“Under the entire fairness standard of review . . . the 
court itself must be satisfied as to the entire fairness of a challenged 
transaction. Understandably, this stringent review standard is the standard 
most desired by plaintiffs.”). 
 33. See id. at 801 (“Director carelessness does not doctrinally, logically, or 
policy-wise, necessitate that a burden of proof shift to the defendants 
accompanied by close scrutiny of the quality or merits of a business decision.” 
(citing Murphy v. Wakelee, 721 A.2d 1181, 1186 (Conn. 1998) (rejecting the 
claim that proving negligence in a fiduciary’s administration of an estate would 
shift to the fiduciary the burden to prove fairness and holding that this burden 
shift would necessitate a prior showing of fraud, self-dealing, or conflict of 
interest))). 
 34. See id. at 799 
[N]one of the authority cited in either Cede II or Cede III supports the 
novel proposition that, in a duty of care case, a director must carry 
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A second criticism leveled by Professor Johnson was that 
Technicolor’s “quest for rhetorical [doctrinal] coherence” is 
unworkable because “the business judgment rule is ill-equipped 
to serve as the umbrella concept for analytically linking director 
duties (care, loyalty, and good faith) with standards of judicial 
review.”35 The duties of care and loyalty govern corporate 
directors whether or not the directors make a business decision, 
but the business judgment review standard applies only in cases 
where directors actually make such a decision.36 To make the 
narrow business judgment standard the framework for unifying 
the judicial analysis of fiduciary conduct, and in particular the 
duty of care, “will either be to mistakenly contract the pervasive 
duty of care to fit the business judgment rule framework, or 
eventually to regard the new framework as considerably less-
encompassing than might initially appear.”37 
Professor Johnson reserved his most trenchant criticism of 
Technicolor for its misconception and treatment of the fiduciary 
duty of care. First, he argued, the Delaware Supreme Court 
“[faultily equated] a director’s informedness with a director’s duty 
of care (thereby not grasping the genuine fullness of a due care 
inquiry).”38 The duty of care, he explained, is far broader, and 
includes not only the element of being informed, but also “the 
larger process of directors subsequently acting with ‘requisite 
care in the discharge of their duties.’”39 By improperly 
formulating due care, Professor Johnson urged, the Technicolor 
                                                                                                     
the burden of proving the entire fairness of a challenged 
transaction . . . . [T]he Delaware Supreme Court decisions cited in 
Cede II to support the proposition that in a duty of care case the 
defendant directors have the burden of proving the entire fairness of 
a transaction, all involved director self-interest, thus . . . implicating 
loyalty and not merely care. 
 35. Id. at 802. 
 36. See id. (“Both the duty of care and the duty of loyalty govern corporate 
directors whether or not directors make business decisions, while the business 
judgment rule applies only when directors do make such decisions.”). 
 37. Id. at 803. Professor Johnson cites, as one example, the case where a 
duty of care breach results from faulty director monitoring (a Caremark claim). 
Such a claim does not fit into a formulation “that analytically subsumes the 
richer duty of care under the important but more confined business judgment 
rubric.” Id. 
 38. Id. at 801. 
 39. Id. at 806 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). 
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court shrunk the duty and deprived it of its proper place in 
corporate jurisprudence.40 Therefore, he argued, the Delaware 
courts need to “restor[e] due care as a meaningful cornerstone of 
Delaware law” by requiring “the plaintiff (and the court) to 
address not only the directors’ state of informedness, but also, 
critically, whether directors acted with due care in light of that 
information.”41 Rethinking Director Care then proceeded to 
elaborate more finely the nature and proper application of the 
duty of care concept, emphasizing that due care analysis should 
focus on the soundness of the director decision-making 
process42—not on the result—and, moreover, that even if that 
process were deficient, no liability should attach unless the due 
care violation is shown to have harmed the corporation or its 
shareholders.43 In other words, Professor Johnson argued, 
Chancellor Allen got it right in his Technicolor trial court opinion 
that the Supreme Court later disapproved.44  
Lastly, Professor Johnson circled back to the Technicolor 
“burden shift and entire fairness approach to duty of care 
breaches,” which “not only finds no doctrinal support . . . [but] 
also cavalierly negates longstanding rationales for divergent 
standards of judicial review in the care and loyalty areas.”45 
Johnson reemphasized that 
[c]are cases, unlike loyalty cases, do not deprive corporations 
of ‘neutral decision-makers’ . . . . Consequently, a care breach, 
contrary to what [Technicolor holds], should not result in a 
judicial review of substance . . . . In the care setting, the proper 
inquiry is whether an undoubtedly neutral decision-maker 
acted in the proper manner; that inquiry does not ever 
necessitate or warrant judicial inquiry into the substantive 
                                                                                                     
 40. See id. at 807 (calling for differentiation of being informed from the 
notion of care itself in order to “avoid a wrong belief that the larger care analysis 
is exhausted with the informedness inquiry under the business judgment rule”). 
 41. Id. 
 42. See id. at 814 (“The key judicial inquiry is the soundness of a board’s 
overall decision-making process . . . .”). 
 43. See id. at 826 (“Damages may be nonexistent or limited if . . . as it turns 
out, that little or no harm was caused by director carelessness.”). 
 44. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 370 (overruling Chancellor 
Allen’s requirement of proving that the board’s gross negligence caused 
monetary loss to Cinerama). 
 45. Johnson, Rethinking Director Care, supra note 5, at 824. 
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merits of a decision, only into the process by which it was 
made.46 
B. The Modest Business Judgment Rule 
In his second article, The Modest BJR, Professor Johnson 
continued his critique of Technicolor, but focused more 
specifically upon the business judgment rule itself.47 Here again, 
Johnson argued, the Delaware courts, in Technicolor and other 
cases, had improperly “formulate[d] the business judgment rule 
and unsoundly [made] it the centerpiece of corporate fiduciary 
analysis.”48 Although the duty of care and the business judgment 
rule “oftentime seem hopelessly entangled,” they require 
untangling for the sake of doctrinal clarity and good policy.49 
[T]he business judgment rule is not usefully regarded as either 
a substantive standard for affirmatively guiding judicial 
review of director conduct, or a process-oriented standard for 
guiding judicial review; and, finally, it is not at all designed for 
fulfilling the task assigned in [Technicolor]—organizing 
judicial fiduciary analysis into an overarching, seemingly 
coherent framework. 
Properly understood, the business judgment rule is simply a 
policy of judicial non-review . . . . A more modest expression of 
the sound statutory and policy bases underlying this judicial 
deference to director decisions—as embodied in the business 
judgment rule—is, therefore as follows: 
“[W]here money damages or equitable relief is sought, the 
business judgment rule is a judicial policy of not reviewing the 
substantive merits of a board of directors’ business decision for 
the purpose of determining whether directors breached or 
fulfilled their duty of care.”50 
                                                                                                     
 46. Id. at 822–23. 
 47. See Johnson, The Modest BJR, supra note 7, at 625 (“The business 
judgment rule . . . is better understood as a narrow-gauged policy of non-review 
than as an overarching framework for affirmatively shaping judicial review of 
fiduciary performance.”). 
 48. Id.  
 49. See id. at 650–51 (calling for distinction between the duty of due care 
and the business judgment rule as a matter of good policy). 
 50. Id. at 628–31 (footnotes omitted). 
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Professor Johnson argued that untangling the duty of care 
from the business judgment rule is best accomplished by 
refocusing on the original policy purpose of these distinct 
corporate law concepts, and then reformulating and applying 
those concepts consistent with that purpose.51 Thus, he reasoned: 
If [a] plaintiff proves [that] a director did not act with due care, 
whether from nonfeasance or misfeasance, that alone is a 
breach of fiduciary duty and, absent statutory exoneration, he 
or she should be held liable for all damages proximately 
caused thereby. It is not the case, as [Technicolor] held, that a 
proven breach of care somehow “overrides” the policy of non-
review embodied in the business judgment rule—a policy the 
[Technicolor] court must regard as highly contingent—and 
that the rule somehow “falls away” in [case of] a 
breach . . . thereby freeing the judiciary to examine . . . the 
substantive quality of a carelessly rendered business 
decision.52 
The fundamental conceptual error propagated by 
Technicolor, Professor Johnson explained, was to conflate a 
standard of conduct (the fiduciary duty of care) with a standard of 
judicial review (the business judgment rule).53 The former 
standard dictates what conduct is required of the fiduciary; the 
latter prescribes how a court should go about determining 
whether liability should attach for a breach of the standard of 
conduct (if any there was).54 It is critical that courts distinguish 
                                                                                                     
 51. See id. at 651 (“[T]he duty of due care, in formulation and function, 
should be differentiated from the single-focus policy expressed in the business 
judgment rule.”). 
 52. Id. at 634. On this point, Professor Johnson concludes by adding: 
The contrary [Technicolor] position, making the intensity of judicial 
review toward the merits of the directors’ business judgment 
contingent on whether directors fulfilled or breached the due care 
duty, is unprecedented on doctrinal grounds, faulty on a policy basis, 
and utterly counter to the deference embodied in a modest, but 
consistently-applied, business judgment rule.  
Id. at 635. 
 53. See id. at 651 (stating that the standard of conduct [the fiduciary duty 
of care] is a pre-condition to the standard of review [the business judgment 
rule]). 
 54. See id. at 647 
Understanding the duty of care as a vital and independent duty of 
directors, not merely a “component” of the [Technicolor] business 
judgment rule, will led to breaches of that duty being treated as 
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between these two concepts, for the reasons previously elaborated 
in Professor Melvin A. Eisenberg’s classic article Professor 
Johnson cited in The Modest BJR.55  
C. Remembering Loyalty 
Perhaps recognizing that a critical component had been left 
out of his earlier critiques of the duty of care and the business 
judgment rule as formulated by the Delaware courts, Professor 
Johnson remedied the oversight in a third article, Remembering 
Loyalty.56 There, Professor Johnson aimed his laser-like focus on 
the overly narrow and incomplete expressions of the fiduciary 
duty of loyalty, in both the Delaware court decisions and in the 
scholarship of certain law and economics academics.57 Johnson’s 
central thesis was that the duty of loyalty embraces more than 
the negative requirement that directors, as fiduciaries, must 
refrain from bringing their personal, economic interest into 
conflict with, and from betraying, the interest of their stockholder 
beneficiaries.58 Rather, loyalty also encompasses a moral element, 
which he described as an “affirmative [duty] of devotion”59 to the 
interests of those beneficiaries, even where the fiduciaries have 
no conflicting financial or other economic self-interest. That 
                                                                                                     
wrongs in and of themselves, not simply as triggers for effecting a 
burden shift and a concomitant dropping of judicial inhibitions 
against examining the merits of business decisions. 
 55. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and 
Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 467 (1993) 
[S]tandards of review, which govern liability and validity, are not 
themselves standards of conduct. A director or officer who engages in 
self-interested conduct without having dealt fairly has acted wrongly, 
even though he is protected against liability by the relevant standard 
of review. A director or officer who makes an unreasonable decision 
has acted wrongly, even though he is protected against liability under 
the business-judgment rule.  
 56. See Johnson, Remembering Loyalty, supra note 8. 
 57. See id. at 47–55 (criticizing the law and economics approach to 
fiduciary duty judicial decision making). 
 58. See id. at 38 (differentiating between the concepts of maximum and 
minimum conditions of loyalty by defining minimum condition as a negative 
duty) (citing GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY—AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF 
RELATIONSHIPS 9 (1993)). 
 59. Id. 
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broader component of devotedness, he explained, should be 
formally recognized by the courts of Delaware.60 Professor 
Johnson’s call for courts to broaden their articulation of fiduciary 
loyalty (like his earlier call for courts to broaden their expression 
of fiduciary care) was carefully supported by reasoned 
arguments.61 Because two of those tropes turned out to be 
prophetic, we summarize them here. 
First, Professor Johnson acknowledged that the dividing line 
between loyalty and care was less than sharp, and that “the 
concept of care remains an integral part of corporate law through 
the doctrine of loyalty . . . [and] is an attractive and 
philosophically compelling position.”62 Nonetheless, he argued, to 
conflate the two concepts would be “a dangerous strategy because 
it risks a rhetorical obliteration of any conceptually sharp 
boundary line between care and loyalty—two notions often 
thought to occupy separate spheres.”63 As a strictly legal matter, 
Johnson argued, judges must “differentiate loyalty from care for 
the purpose of interpreting [8 Del. C.] section 102(b)(7) and 
similar corporate statutes in other states.”64  
                                                                                                     
 60. See id. at 40–42 (detailing the extensive support for an affirmative duty 
of loyalty and advocating for its adoption by the Delaware courts). 
 61. See id. (outlining various examples accepting the affirmative and 
maximum condition of loyalty in corporate law discourse, including not only by 
the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance, but by the 
Delaware Supreme Court itself in Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. Ch. 1939)). 
 62. Id. at 32. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 42. As Johnson further explained, 
Corporate law’s binary liability scheme . . . as manifested in section 
102(b)(7) and similar statutes in other states, contemplates no such 
ill-defined dividing line between the two duties. Supposedly, 
Delaware law is clear in that directors face no personal liability for 
breach of ‘care’ claims, only for breach of ‘loyalty’ claims.  
Further elaborating the need for a bright line, Professor Johnson urged that  
Courts . . . must say with greater precision what sort of director 
conduct implicates loyalty (allowing damages) and what sort 
implicates only care (prohibiting damages). Before enactment of 
section 102(b)(7), it was enough to find a fiduciary breach of some 
sort, at least for purposes of awarding damages, whether it was 
grounded in care, loyalty, or both. 
Id. at 58–59. 
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Second, Remembering Loyalty recognized, although obliquely, 
that the duty to act in “good faith,” although described in 
Technicolor as a fiduciary duty separate and apart from the 
duties of care and loyalty, is more properly regarded as an 
element of the duty of loyalty.65 Reasoning from Chancellor 
Allen’s insight in Caremark that “a sustained or systematic 
failure of the board to exercise oversight . . . will establish the 
lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability,”66 
Professor Johnson presciently concluded that “a ‘sustained or 
systematic failure’ of oversight is a failure to ‘take care of’ or 
properly ‘care for’ the interests of the corporation and its 
stockholders [and] [i]n this respect . . . is a breach of the 
affirmative dimension of loyalty.”67 
D. Lyman Johnson’s Contribution to Delaware Corporate Law 
Doctrine 
That Professor Johnson’s writing has profoundly affected 
Delaware corporate law doctrine is a proposition that borders on 
axiomatic. Not long after the aforementioned seminal articles 
were published, then-Vice Chancellor (now Chief Justice) Leo E. 
Strine, Jr. echoed Lyman Johnson’s criticism of Technicolor in In 
re Gaylord Container Corp. Shareholders’ Litigation.68 There, 
Vice Chancellor Strine, citing and quoting with approval The 
Modest BJR, argued that it made little sense for Delaware courts 
to employ the business judgment rule (“a policy of judicial non-
review”)69 as an overall principle of doctrinal unification.70 
                                                                                                     
 65. See id. at 69 (explaining that good faith is itself a requirement of the 
director’s duty of loyalty) (citing In re Gaylord Container Corp. S’holders Litig., 
753 A.2d 462, 475–76 n.41 (Del. Ch. 2000)). 
 66. In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 
1996). 
 67. Johnson, Remembering Loyalty, supra note 8, at 46 n.112. As support 
for his conclusion, Professor Johnson cited then-Vice Chancellor Strine’s 
pronouncements to that effect in In re Gaylord Container Corp. S’holders Litig., 
753 A.2d 462, 475–76, n.4 (Del. Ch. 2000) and Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 
48–49 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
 68. 753 A.2d 462 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
 69. Id. at 475 n.39. 
 70. See id. at 477 n.46 (“[I]t might also be clearer to reformulate the Unocal 
test so that it incorporates the concept of due deference to board judgment 
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Focusing specifically upon the structural oddity of the Delaware 
Supreme Court’s formulation of the Unocal standard of review, 
the Vice Chancellor urged that Unocal should be a free-standing 
test of the propriety of board defensive anti-takeover measures.71 
But, under the current doctrinal formulation: 
Unocal’s purpose and application have been cloaked in a 
larger, rather ill-fitting doctrinal garment. Once the court 
applies the Unocal test, its job is, as a technical matter, not 
over. If, upon applying Unocal, the court finds that the 
defendants have met their burden of demonstrating the 
substantive reasonableness of their actions, the court must 
then . . . reimpose on the plaintiffs the burden of showing “by a 
preponderance of the evidence” that the business judgment 
rule is inapplicable . . . . It is not at all apparent how a plaintiff 
could meet this burden in a circumstance where the board met 
its burden under Unocal. To the extent that the plaintiff has 
persuasive evidence of disloyalty (for example, that the board 
acted in a self-interested or bad-faith fashion), this would 
fatally undercut the board’s Unocal showing. Similarly, it is 
hard to see how a plaintiff could rebut the presumption of the 
business judgment rule by demonstrating that the board acted 
in a grossly careless manner in a circumstance where the 
board had demonstrated that it had acted reasonably and 
proportionately. Least of all could a plaintiff show that the 
board’s actions lacked a rational business purpose . . . where 
the board had already demonstrated that those actions were 
reasonable, i.e., were rational.72  
The Vice Chancellor’s criticisms were a precursor to a more 
comprehensive doctrinal critique set forth in an article 
co-authored by former Chancellor William T. Allen and then-Vice 
Chancellors Jack B. Jacobs and Leo Strine and published one 
year later in The Business Lawyer.73 From the article itself, it is 
facially evident that it was influenced by Professor Johnson’s 
                                                                                                     
articulated in Unocal and Unirtrin without confusing burden-shifting required 
to tie everything to the business judgment and entire fairness standards.”). 
 71. See id. at 474–75 (“[T]he Unocal test is a straightforward analysis of 
whether what a board did was reasonable.”). 
 72. Id. at 475–76. 
 73. William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function Over 
Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 
BUS. LAW. 1287 (2001) [hereinafter Allen et al., Function Over Form]. Professor 
Hamermesh was actively involved the drafting of Function Over Form, having 
provided helpful comments on the pre-publication draft. 
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writings, which the authors cited liberally in advocating that 
Delaware’s corporate law standards of review be rationalized and 
simplified.74 Thus, the authors in Function Over Form argued 
(among other things) that: 
 There is no policy or practical reason for judicial assessment 
of the substantive fairness of a board’s business, where the 
claim is that the board breached its duty of care.75 In such 
cases, “[a]ny claim that the duty was breached would be 
reviewed under the gross negligence standard, and if a 
breach of duty and resulting harm were found, then liability 
would follow[;]”76 and that 
 The attempted linkage of the business judgment, 
intermediate “reasonableness,” and entire fairness review 
standards is “analytically and functionally unnecessary. 
Judicial review under Unocal/Unitrin should stand on its 
own, ‘decoupled’ from ‘second step’ review under [the 
business judgment or entire fairness] review standards.”77 
Professor Johnson’s concepts of judicial review influenced 
Delaware case law as well.78 In Brehm v. Eisner,79 the Delaware 
Supreme Court echoed his cautionary observation that judicial 
review of director due care is properly restricted to process, not 
substance.80 As then-Chief Justice Veasey put it: 
                                                                                                     
 74. See id. at 864 (“In our view, a rigorous functional evaluation of existing 
corporate law standards of review will clarify their application, reduce their 
number, and facilitate the task of corporate advisors and courts.”). 
 75. See id. at 876 (“In the due care context, the plaintiff should be able to 
identify whatever harm flowed from the neutral decision-makers’ alleged breach 
of care, and thereby obviate any need for judicial assessment of the substantive 
fairness of the board’s business decision.”). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 884. 
 78. See In re Gaylord Container Corp. S’holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 475 
(Del. Ch. 2000) (citing Professor Johnson in support of the business judgment 
rule and its purpose). 
 79. 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 80. See Johnson, The Modest BJR, supra note 7, at 631 (arguing that the 
proper formulation of the business judgment rule is: “[W]here money damages 
or equitable relief is sought, the business judgment rule is a judicial policy of not 
reviewing the substantive merits of a board of directors’ business decision for 
the purpose of determining whether directors breached or fulfilled their duty of 
care.”); see also Johnson, Rethinking Director Care, supra note 5, at 825 (“The 
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As for the plaintiffs’ contention that the directors failed to 
exercise “substantive due care,” we should note that such a 
concept is foreign to the business judgment rule. Courts do not 
measure, weigh or quantify directors’ judgments. We do not 
even decide if they are reasonable in this context. Due care in 
the decisionmaking context is process due care only.81 
Similarly influenced were the courts in the epic Disney82 
litigation, which required the Delaware courts to explore the 
relationship between the fiduciary duties of care, good faith and 
loyalty, and to demarcate the boundary that separates them.83 In 
his post-trial decision, then-Chancellor Chandler accurately 
observed that Delaware case law up to that point was “far from 
clear with respect to whether there is a separate fiduciary duty of 
good faith” as distinguished from the duty of loyalty.84 On appeal 
the Delaware Supreme Court, in affirming the Chancellor’s 
decision and echoing Professor Johnson’s reasoning in 
Remembering Loyalty, stated unambiguously that the duties of 
care, loyalty and good faith, while perhaps similar from a 
psychological or philosophical standpoint, must be conceptually 
and legally separate and distinct.85 And although the Disney 
Court did not address the issue—foreshadowed by Remembering 
Loyalty and the decisions and articles described above—of 
whether or not the duty of loyalty and the duty of good faith were 
one and the same, that issue was addressed front and center later 
that same year by the Delaware Supreme Court in Stone v. 
Ritter.86 There, the Court determined that there was no separate, 
                                                                                                     
substantive quality of any action whether taken or not—whether described as 
‘rational,’ ‘reasonable,’ or ‘fair’—is not an issue in a care case because only the 
manner of conduct is at issue.”). 
 81. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264. 
 82. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 760 (Del. Ch. 
2005), aff’d. 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
 83. See id. (citing Remembering Loyalty and referring to Johnson’s 
discussion therein of care, loyalty, and good faith). 
 84. Id. at 753. 
 85. See Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d 
27, 65 n.104 (Del. 2006) (“Although the coexistence of both states of mind may 
make them indistinguishable from a psychological standpoint, the fiduciary 
duties that they cause the director to violate—care and good faith—are legally 
separate and distinct.”). 
 86. See 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (“The failure to act in good faith 
may result in liability because the requirement to act in good faith ‘is a 
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freestanding duty of good faith, a breach of which could result in 
liability. Rather, good faith is a “subsidiary element[,] i.e., a 
condition, ‘of the fundamental duty of loyalty.’”87 Thus, the Court 
held: 
[A]lthough good faith may be described colloquially as part of a 
“triad” of fiduciary duties that includes the duties of care and 
loyalty, the obligation to act in good faith does not establish an 
independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing as 
the duties of care and loyalty. Only the latter two duties, 
where violated, may directly result in liability, whereas a 
failure to act in good faith may do so, but indirectly.88 
Lyman Johnson’s insights into fiduciary law and doctrine 
were undoubtedly developed in solitude and were the product of a 
scholar’s inner dialogue with himself. We doubt that Lyman, 
being a quintessentially modest person, had any motive or reason 
to anticipate that those insights would be as widely influential or 
prophetic as they turned out to be. But they were, and in the 
process he did himself, Washington and Lee University School of 
Law, and the larger corporate community proud. 
III. Lyman Johnson and the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate 
Officers 
Among the main subjects in Professor Johnson’s formidable 
scholarly repertoire are the fiduciary duties of corporate officers 
and the standards by which the courts are to judge whether 
officers have fulfilled those duties.89 He has repeatedly striven to 
elevate those duties in the consciousness of officers and those who 
                                                                                                     
subsidiary element[,]’ i.e., a condition, ‘of the fundamental duty of loyalty.’” 
(quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003))). 
 87. Id. at 370. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Johnson, Rethinking Director Care, supra note 5 (discussing the 
appropriate standard of care within the business judgment rule); Johnson, The 
Modest BJR, supra note 7 (exploring Delaware’s current standard under the 
business judgment rule and directors’ fiduciary duty and proposing a separation 
of the business judgment rule and the duty of due care); Johnson, Remembering 
Loyalty, supra note 8 (separating directors’ duties of care and loyalty and 
expanding on the latter duty and its importance in corporate governance). 
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advise them.90 In so doing, Professor Johnson once again proved 
himself prophetic: after years of uncertainty in which inferior 
courts could only guess that officers owed fiduciary duties 
equivalent to those owed by directors,91 the Delaware Supreme 
Court, in 2009, finally so held explicitly.92 
Professor Johnson’s work on the fiduciary duties of officers 
has propagated a wave of scholarship that has undoubtedly 
sensitized the Delaware courts to the issues surrounding that 
subject.93 From examination of officers’ fiduciary duties 
generally94 to inquiries into officers’ fiduciary duty of disclosure,95 
                                                                                                     
 90. See generally Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Robert Ricca, Reality Check on 
Officer Liability, 67 BUS. LAW. 75 (2011) (differentiating between the fiduciary 
duty obligations of corporate officers and directors and the need for a complete 
development of the fiduciary duties of each); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Robert V. 
Ricca, (Not) Advising Corporate Officers About Fiduciary Duties, 42 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 663 (2007) (articulating the unsettled law concerning the 
responsibilities of corporate officers need for said officers to understand their 
fiduciary duties); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Having the Fiduciary Duty Talk: Model 
Advice for Corporate Officers (And Other Senior Agents), 63 BUS. LAW. 147 
(2007) (highlighting the lack of instruction regarding corporate officers’ 
fiduciary duty and proposing a model for lawyers to use when advising corporate 
officers); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers 
Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597 (2005) (criticizing the failure to 
distinguish fiduciary duties of corporate officers and directors and advocating a 
separation to promote structure within corporate governance and to further 
director-officer relations within public corporations); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, 
Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439 (2005) 
[hereinafter Johnson, Corporate Officers] (arguing that the business judgment 
rule should not be extended to corporate officers in the same manner as it 
applies to corporate directors and calling for closer judicial scrutiny of officer 
conduct). 
 91. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 132, 
at *14 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 2004) (“To date, the fiduciary duties of officers have 
been assumed to be identical to those of directors.”). 
 92. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009) (“In the past, 
we have implied that officers of Delaware corporations, like directors, owe 
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, and that the fiduciary duties of officers are 
the same as those of directors. We now explicitly so hold.”).  
 93. Infra notes 94–97. 
 94. See generally Amitai Aviram, Officers’ Fiduciary Duties and the Nature 
of Corporate Organs, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 763 (2013); Deborah A. DeMott, Inside 
the Corporate Veil: The Character and Consequences of Executives Duties, 19 
AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 251, 252–54 (2006); Paul Graf, A Realistic Approach to Officer 
Liability, 66 BUS. LAW. 315 (2011); Aaron D. Jones, Corporate Officer 
Wrongdoing and the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Officers Under Delaware 
Law, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 475 (2007); Megan W. Shaner, The (Un)Enforcement of 
Corporate Officers’ Duties, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 271 (2014). 
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officers’ duty of obedience,96 and the application to officers of the 
business judgment rule,97 Professor Johnson’s work has been the 
intellectual catalyst for much of the scholarly analysis generated 
since he entered the field. And his work will remain an important 
voice in the disposition of questions of Delaware corporate law 
not yet resolved. As the Delaware Court of Chancery has noted: 
The Delaware Supreme Court has not addressed the standard 
of review that a court should use when evaluating officer 
decision making. A lively debate exists regarding the degree to 
which decisions by officers should be examined using the same 
standards of review developed for directors.98 
Professor Johnson’s contribution to making the debate about 
the application of the business judgment rule to officer conduct 
“lively” can hardly be overstated. Focusing on a relatively dated 
practitioner article that drily reviewed the case law on the subject 
and concluded that the business judgment rule does, in fact, 
apply to officers, at least to a large extent,99 Professor Johnson 
sharply questioned the precedential support for that position and, 
more importantly, advanced a trenchant policy analysis of the 
issue (prompting the practitioners to up their game and respond 
more fully on a policy basis as well).100 As then-Vice Chancellor 
                                                                                                     
 95. See generally Z. Jill Barclift, Senior Corporate Officers and the Duty of 
Candor: Do the CEO and CFO Have a Duty to Inform?, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 269, 
270 (2006); Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems 
of Candor and Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187 (2003). 
 96. See generally Megan W. Shaner, Restoring the Balance of Power in 
Corporate Management: Enforcing an Officer’s Duty of Obedience, 66 BUS. LAW. 
27 (2010). 
 97. See generally Deborah H. DeMott, Corporate Officers as Agents, 74 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 813 (2017); Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks 
III, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor 
Johnson, 60 BUS. LAW. 865 (2005). 
 98. Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 666 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2014) (citing 
Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 
BUS. LAW. 439 (2005)); Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks, III, 
Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor 
Johnson, 60 BUS. LAW. 865 (2005)). 
 99. See A. Gilchrist Sparks, III & Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Common Law 
Duties of Non-Director Corporate Officers, 48 BUS. LAW. 215, 237 (1992) (“The 
business judgment rule is almost universally applied to officers.”). 
 100. See Johnson, Corporate Officers, supra note 90, at 443 (“Existing 
commentary does not make—or even attempt to make—a very compelling policy 
case for extending the business judgment rule to officers but, instead, largely 
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Strine noted in a 2010 opinion, “[t]here are important and 
interesting questions about the extent to which officers and 
employees should be more or less exposed to liability for breach of 
fiduciary duty than corporate directors.”101 It is Professor 
Johnson who deserves thanks for bringing out those “important 
and interesting” policy questions.  
IV. Lyman Johnson’s Contribution to the Proper Focus of 
Corporate Purpose 
Much ink has been spilled on the subject of corporate 
purpose,102 but on this subject Lyman Johnson does not spill ink: 
rather, he aims it precisely and pointedly, and usually hits his 
target. In this section we pay our respects to instances where we 
believe that Professor Johnson’s comments may have hit the 
mark; but from our perspective as members of the Delaware 
corporate law community, we note a respectful disagreement with 
the prophet—a point on which, if past is prologue, we may well 
end up being proven wrong about (or perhaps already have been). 
At the risk of repeating what others are contributing to this 
symposium,103 we begin our review of Professor Johnson’s 
contribution to the analysis of corporate purpose by tracing the 
                                                                                                     
recites case law. That case law, it turns out, is actually quite ‘sparse.’”). 
 101. Hampshire Grp., Ltd. v. Kuttner, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 144, at *35 (Del. 
Ch. July 12, 2010). 
 102. For notable entries in this debate, see generally KENT GREENFIELD, THE 
FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW 127–30 (2006); William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic 
Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 265 (1992) 
(“The corporation’s purpose is to advance the purposes of these [stockholder-
owners], and the function of directors, as agents of the owners, is faithfully to 
advance the financial interests of the owners.”); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom 
Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1148 (1932); David 
Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1374 (1993); Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, 
Conservative Collision Course? The Tension Between Conservative Theory and 
Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335 (2015); Lynn A. Stout, Bad And Not-
So-Bad Arguments For Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189 (2002). 
 103. See generally Ronald J. Colombo, Religious Conceptions of Corporate 
Purpose, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 813 (2017); Brett H. McDonnell, Between Sin 
and Redemption: Duty, Purpose, and Regulation in Religious Corporations, 74 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043 (2017); Robert K. Vischer, Confident Pluralism in 
Corporate Theory, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1179 (2017). 
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development of his scholarship on that subject. We begin with his 
2003 article urging a more robust view of the duty of loyalty,104 in 
which he challenged the prevailing academic view that fiduciary 
duties “have no moral footing,” and are merely “the same sort of 
obligations, derived and enforced the same way, as other 
contractual undertakings.”105 In that article, we see Professor 
Johnson plead that “corporate law must decide whether the 
director, to whom the duties of loyalty and care attach, is to be 
regarded as a full-fledged, human, moral actor.”106 Reflecting his 
belief that “judges can and should infuse fiduciary law with 
widely-shared cultural norms,” that article “applauds” the 
embrace of moral norms and rhetoric in defining the duty of 
loyalty.107 Professor Johnson’s relatively expansive view of the 
duty of loyalty found expression in Chancellor Chandler’s 2005 
opinion in the Walt Disney/Ovitz stockholder litigation describing 
the concept of “good faith” as requiring “not simply the duties of 
care and loyalty . . . but all actions required by a true faithfulness 
and devotion to the interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders.”108 
Three years after Remembering Loyalty appeared, Professor 
Johnson developed a claim that pointed to extending the broader, 
morally-centered conception of corporate law to all corporate 
actors, not just directors.109 Citing the work of non-legal scholars, 
Johnson noted a criticism of “shareholder primacy,” with its focus 
“exclusively on a corporation’s financial return” to investors, as “a 
                                                                                                     
 104. See Johnson, Remembering Loyalty, supra note 8, at 72–73 (urging for a 
renewed focus on the importance and necessity of the duty of loyalty in the 
aftermath of the Enron scandal). 
 105. Id. at 47 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract 
and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J. L. & ECON. 425, 427 (1993)). 
 106. Id. at 48. 
 107. Id. at 53. 
 108. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 
2005), aff’d 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). In the Chancery Court opinion, Chancellor 
Chandler acknowledges the Court’s intellectual debt to Professor Johnson, 
describing Remembering Loyalty as “about the richer historical and literary 
understanding of loyalty and care, beyond their narrower ‘non-betrayal’ and 
‘process’ uses in contemporary jurisprudence.” Id. at 760 n.487. 
 109. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in Corporate Theory, 
56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006) (arguing that “neither discourse within the 
corporate institution itself nor within corporate law theory must be wholly 
secular”). 
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foundational good” that should nonetheless be considered only “as 
a means to higher, more excellent goods, not an end in itself.”110 
At the same time, he noted (and decried) the relative paucity of 
corporate law scholarship that “examines the corporation from a 
religious vantage point.”111 In this article Johnson advocated a 
non-regulatory approach that “honors the reality of managerial 
discretion by leaving to corporate decision-makers themselves, 
and their legal counsel—not legislators—the task of deciding 
whether and how to translate legal responsibilities into specific 
courses of action based on religious belief.”112 As Professor 
Johnson conceived it, a “faith-based conception of faithfulness” 
would “allow managers to frame, and argue for, a redemptive 
counterpoise” to the “prevailing discourse and norm of self-
interest” pervading corporate legal scholarship.113 A few years 
later, in Re-Enchanting the Corporation,114 Professor Johnson 
even more sharply articulated his beef with that “prevailing 
discourse” in corporate law scholarship. His analysis in that piece 
began with what surely is a modest but unassailable proposition: 
“If religious faith—for some people—forms the very fiber and 
foundation of who they are (their self-concept) and how they 
interact with others (their relationships), we should expect faith 
to influence behavior in the corporate world.”115 Professor 
Johnson recognized, of course, that this unassailable proposition 
still left open the question of whether and to what extent 
corporate law—and its articulation of corporate purpose—permits 
corporate actors to exercise their authority to conduct the 
corporation’s business in order to promote that faith at the 
expense of shareholder wealth maximization.116 In particular, he 
recognized that “legal freedom necessarily is a critical predicate 
                                                                                                     
 110. Id. at 14–15. 
 111. Id. at 17. 
 112. Id. at 20. 
 113. Id. at 34. 
 114. Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Re-Enchanting the Corporation, 1 WM. & MARY 
BUS. L. REV. 83 (2010) [hereinafter Johnson, Re-Enchanting]. 
 115. Id. at 90–91. 
 116. See id. at 96 (observing that companies vary in how they balance profit-
motivated actions with other pursuits, such as the well-being of associates or 
employees). 
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to any call for more ethical and socially responsible conduct in the 
private sector.”117  
Does that “legal freedom” exist? To answer that question, 
Lyman asserts—again, unassailably—that “humans both value 
and reward cooperative behavior in others,” and that “[t]his more 
well-rounded conception of people is at odds with standard, 
oversimplified assumptions in neoclassical economic theory—
uncritically embedded in much corporate theory . . . .”118 We agree 
wholeheartedly with that view, and with Lyman’s further point 
that “there need not be a monistic model in a market system, as 
opposed to a more pluralistic approach.”119 We also agree with his 
approving citation of a 2009 papal encyclical urging that “there 
must be room for commercial entities based on mutualist 
principles and pursuing social ends to take root and express 
themselves.”120 
Professor Johnson reiterated these views even more clearly 
in a 2013 article on the relatively new legal construct of benefit 
corporations.121 Based on the view that “[m]any persons—
whether out of philosophical or religious convictions or other 
beliefs—seek work (and a workplace) where meaning beyond 
material gain for investors can be pursued and where vocation 
puts principles into practice,”122 Lyman again urged that “as to 
capital providers themselves, law should acknowledge the 
possible heterogeneity of preferences rather than assume a 
shared taste for ‘maximizing’ at all costs.”123 As Professor 
Johnson explained, “there is no reason why, with respect to 
business corporations, there cannot be a pluralism of market-
oriented entities designed to advance different purposes.”124 We 
                                                                                                     
 117. Id. at 100. 
 118. Id. at 90. 
 119. Id. at 96. 
 120. Id. (quoting Encyclical Letter Caritas in Veritate, LIBRERIA EDITRICE 
VATICANA (June 29, 2009), http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-
xvi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate.html 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)). 
 121. Lyman P. Q. Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law 
and Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269 (2013) [hereinafter Johnson, 
Pluralism in Corporate Form]. 
 122. Id. at 280–81. 
 123. Id. at 281. 
 124. Id. at 280. 
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agree with that claim, and with his proposition that benefit 
corporation legislation—recently adopted in Delaware in 
2013125—“usefully advances pluralism in corporate forms of 
organization,” even if it remains to be seen whether and to what 
extent investors embrace the benefit corporation form and benefit 
corporations are able to effectively promote the public good.126 
The benefit corporation’s ability to serve as a vehicle for investors 
interested in promoting public goods moves us to support 
legislation—particularly the Delaware public benefit corporation 
statutes—that enables the creation of such vehicles. 
So far, we are in lock step with Professor Johnson on the 
utility of pluralism in corporate form, and with his aspiration 
that the availability of divergent corporate forms will enable 
investors and managers to effectuate motivations to serve the 
public good and not merely the goal of wealth maximization. At 
this point, however, we come to our parting of the ways with 
Lyman’s views—a move we make with reluctance, given his 
extraordinarily capable and deep analysis of the subject of 
corporate purpose. We are from Delaware. And like most of our 
fellow citizens who have written on this subject, either in judicial 
opinions or published articles,127 we maintain that for an investor 
who has not expressly manifested a contrary preference, the 
purpose of the Delaware business corporation is maximization of 
the wealth of its stockholders. We further maintain that this is at 
                                                                                                     
 125. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–368 (2013). 
 126. Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form, supra note 121, at 293–97.  
 127. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 
182 (Del. 1986) (“A board may have regard for various constituencies in 
discharging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits 
accruing to the stockholders.”); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 
A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (lauding craigslist, Inc. for desiring to serve a 
community, but finding that as a for-profit Delaware corporation, the company 
is bound by the duties to shareholders that accompany the corporate form); 
Strine, supra note 102, at 351–352 
[Conservative corporate theory] recognizes that the only thing that is 
common to all stockholders who hold a pure long position in the 
corporation should be a desire to see the corporation increase its 
profits and stock price. . . . [W]hen the corporation begins to pursue as 
an end other values, there is no rational reason to believe that the 
stockholders are of one mind on those issues, and much less that they 
invested to have the board of directors choose one perspective on the 
matter to pursue with the corporation's funds. 
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least the default rule, and earnestly doubt that this rule could be 
changed even in the certificate of incorporation of a traditional 
corporation. We take that position in part for reasons that 
Professor Johnson acknowledges: “exclusively investor-oriented 
goals are widely accepted due to deeply-ingrained business lore 
and strong social norms . . . .”128 In light of that wide acceptance, 
we find it compelling that a reasonable investor in shares of a 
business corporation would expect it to be managed so as to 
maximize shareholder profit, within the constraints of the law. 
We therefore submit, as former Chancellor Chandler said in 
eBay, that 
[h]aving chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist 
directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that 
accompany that form. Those standards include acting to 
promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its 
stockholders. The “Inc.” after the company name has to mean 
at least that.129  
We hasten, however, to avoid overstating our position. Professor 
Johnson is right that the shareholder wealth maximization norm 
is not codified in the Delaware General Corporation Law.130 Nor 
is there a Delaware Supreme Court opinion, outside the sale of 
the company context, enshrining that principle even as a default 
rule, let alone a mandatory one.131 Lyman also rightly observed 
that other states’ statutes (particularly the so-called “other 
constituency” statutes) expressly establish a more pluralistic 
                                                                                                     
 128. Johnson, Re-Enchanting, supra note 114, at 90; see also Lyman P.Q. 
Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 28 
(2015) [hereinafter Johnson & Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby] (“[I]t 
is likely safe to describe profit-maximizing behavior as a ‘norm’ or ‘common 
practice’ in the corporate realm . . . . The profit maximization norm . . . is a 
product of deep-seated business lore and practices, market pressures, and 
professional education, not law.”).  
 129. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc., 16 A.3d at 34 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 130. See Johnson & Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, supra note 
128, at 10 (“Delaware corporate law, the most influential body of law for United 
States publicly held corporations, does not mandate shareholder wealth 
maximization. The statute says no such thing. There is virtually no judge-made 
precedent to that effect.”). 
 131. See id. (asserting that there are no Delaware Supreme Court decisions 
mandating shareholder wealth maximization, and citing the statute which 
allows a corporation to be organized to pursue “any lawful business or purpose”). 
LYMAN JOHNSON’S INVALUABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 935 
notion of corporate purpose,132 and that even traditional 
Delaware corporations may engage in acts of corporate 
selflessness, in the form of “reasonable” charitable 
contributions.133 Indeed, the business judgment rule affords a 
great deal of play in the joints that permits regard for the 
interests of non-stockholder interests.134 And, just as 
stockholders, by unanimous consent, can validate an action that 
would otherwise constitute a waste of corporate assets,135 they 
can, by unanimous consent, forego any claim that the corporation 
should be managed for the sole purpose of maximizing 
stockholder gain.136 
Despite all that, we adhere to the view that the “deeply-
ingrained business lore and strong social norms”137 that, as 
                                                                                                     
 132. See, e.g., Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate 
Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 16 (1992) (discussing statutes 
that “purport to expand the traditional view” that directors must make decisions 
primarily to maximize shareholder wealth). 
 133. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (2016) (granting corporations the 
power to make donations for the public welfare); see also Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 
A.2d 48, 61 (Del. 1991) (“[Section 122(9)] has been construed ‘to authorize any 
reasonable corporate gift of a charitable or educational nature.’” (quoting 
Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969))). 
 134. See Johnson & Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, supra note 
128, at 11 n.69 (“When director decisions are reviewed under the business 
judgment rule, this Court will not question rational judgments about how 
promoting non-stockholder interests . . . ultimately promote stockholder value.” 
(quoting eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 
2010))).  
 135. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Bryan, 1978 Del. Ch. LEXIS 500, at *3 (Nov. 6, 
1978) (“[A] waste of corporate assets is incapable of ratification without 
unanimous stockholder consent.” (citing Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 605 (Del. 
Ch. 1962))); Harwell Wells, The Life and Death of Corporate Waste, 74 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. [PAGE NUMBER] (2017) (“The property and funds of a 
corporation . . . cannot be devoted to any use which is not in accordance with 
their chartered purposes, except by unanimous consent.” (citing VICTOR 
MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 399 (1886))). 
 136. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 36 (1991) (“[T]hose who came in at the beginning 
consented, and those who came later bought stock [at a price that] reflected the 
corporation's tempered commitment to a profit objective . . . then no one should 
be allowed to object.”); see also David A. Wishnick, Corporate Purposes in a Free 
Enterprise System: A Comment on eBay v. Newmark, 121 YALE L.J. 2405, 2412 
(arguing that shareholders should be allowed to consent to forgo maximization 
of shareholder profits). 
 137. Johnson, Re-Enchanting, supra note 114, at 99. 
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Professor Johnson acknowledges, embrace the wealth 
maximization principle require that a departure from that 
principle be must sanctioned by stockholder consent. The form 
that consent should take, however, is an intriguing question.138 
Professors Johnson and Millon urge that the determination of 
corporate purpose is simply part of the “business and affairs” of 
the corporation and therefore is a matter that presumptively can 
be established by the board of directors.139 In support of that 
position, one could argue that stockholders inherently consent in 
advance to such a determination: the governing statute invests 
broad powers in the board of directors, so stockholders consent, at 
the outset of their investment (the argument would run), to board 
action to establish the purpose of the corporation.140 That, 
however, is not our understanding of Delaware law: if the board 
of directors enjoyed that kind of power to determine corporate 
purpose, the Delaware Supreme Court in Revlon would not and 
could not have rejected the board’s choice of a sale transaction 
based on its choice to promote the interests of noteholders as well 
as stockholders.141 
Could the requisite consent to an alternate or supplemental 
corporate purpose be manifested in a provision of the certificate 
                                                                                                     
 138. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Consent in Corporate Law, 70 BUS. LAW. 
161, 164–65 (2014) [hereinafter Hamermesh, Consent in Corporate Law] 
(questioning the nature of shareholder consent in a situation involving board-
adopted bylaws). 
 139. See Johnson & Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, supra note 
128, at 30 (“[U]nder standard corporate governance rules it is the board of 
directors that charts a firm’s strategic direction. And the board is free to 
advance the corporation’s mixed objectives over the objections of shareholders 
and at the expense of strict shareholder primacy.”). 
 140. See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 560 (Del. 
2014) (finding that the enforceability of a facially valid bylaw may turn on the 
circumstances of its enactment and use, but that if directors have been 
empowered to enact bylaws, stockholders will be bound by those bylaws); 
Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 955 (Del. Ch. 
2013) (upholding the facial validity of director-adopted bylaws imposing forum 
selection and fee-shifting rules on all stockholders, based upon stockholders’ 
advance consent to charter provisions authorizing the board of directors to adopt 
any bylaw within the broad subject matter purview of 8 Del. C. § 109(b)). 
 141. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 
185 (finding that concern for various corporate constituencies is proper when 
addressing a takeover threat, but that this principle is limited by the 
requirement that there be some related benefit to the stockholders). 
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of incorporation? Clearly such a provision would be legally 
effective in a public benefit corporation.142 But would it be 
effective in a traditional corporation even if adopted by a majority 
of the shares over the objection of minority stockholders? Would it 
be effective in a traditional corporation even if included in the 
certificate of incorporation before the issuance of shares? 
Although we believe that the answer is more likely to be 
affirmative in the latter case,143 we are unable to express an 
unqualified opinion on either question.144 
And that uncertainty brings this subject to a close: it is in the 
nature of a prophet to challenge conventional wisdom, which 
Professor Johnson has repeatedly done, and with great 
intellectual clarity. He and David Millon may well be regarded by 
posterity as prophetic in their identification of an “ongoing shift 
in the norms of corporate purpose to align with broad societal 
expectations of corporate behavior.”145 The merits of that 
aspirational norm are indisputable. What remains to be worked 
out is the means by which that objective is to be achieved. 
                                                                                                     
 142. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (“[A] public benefit corporation shall 
be managed in a manner that balances the stockholders’ pecuniary interests, 
the best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and 
the public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of 
incorporation.”). 
 143. See Hamermesh, Consent in Corporate Law, supra note 138, at 169 
(noting that consent is more likely to be manifested where a charter provision is 
in place prior to investment and is fully disclosed and readily understandable). 
 144. Indeed, that uncertainty may well have motivated the adoption of 
public benefit corporation statutes. 
 145. Johnson & Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, supra note 128, 
at 25. 
